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Buchbesprechungen 
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A Reconstruction of Kant's Moral philos-
J, Gray Cox: The Will ~t th~ Crossroadf A' '1984 pp, XII and 208 , 
o h New York: Umver Ity Press 0 menca , , 
p y, J h ay be understOod as a sustamed , f K nt's mOL" t cory m, I Ie." 
Cox's novel reconstruCtion 0 a 'II d 'were at the crossroad 1a \way 
" hi ' « the! WI tan ,as It , " ' ' h' h ' 
elUCidation of t s pas age, ", h' b' find 'Its a poster/on IIlcentive \V lC IS , , ," Ie w IC IS orma a 
between ItS a pYLon prlnclp ..1, d h'm a holding tbat human agents arc 
, ' retel' of Kanl lea I , h 
material.'" MaLO tream Interp I d be all e it seems the only alternative - t at 
I b' b t then conc u e - c. " not phenomena 0 lects u 1 K ' 1 cory requires and hIS texts permit, a 
al C rgues [lat ant s t1 , h I they are noumen, ox a ". b . posed to be between t e twO rca ms 
, "Th ora! agent must e SUp , d d h further alternatlve: em, '£ e to suppose he is obhgate to 0 as e 
and partaking of both at the same btlmer I wh~'dar distinct ontological kind" (196), If Cox 
Th' , that he must e 0 a t u , I d f '!' ought, IS I to say 'tablishin his ilHerpretation, anyone a r~a y ami lar 
does not althogether succeed . In es ' d h ~ f thri ht account worth enous study, 
with Kant's ethicS will ne~ertheless flU d 25 ~ralle:an~e: that will is both (1) practical 
Four key Kantian doctrines cornman I lOb" I ( .. ) provides an a priori criterion of 
d ) f d tbat mora aW Ot 1 J , th reason an (2 ree; an d I'f' d respect Others professmg came 
" d (4) mman s unqua I I ' I ' I obligation an co I K as (or sometimes means), n partlcu aI', 
, f 'I derstand w lat ant mea 'N! V' ., allegiance, ru to un d' d bb d "The Con titutlvel oumena ICW 
Cox rejects a deeply entrenchedhrea
l 
I,ng. till t (:) will is pitre practical reason. (b) moral. 
[C/N], which a cribes to Kant t C c au~s ,la (c) agents are noumenal beings, and (d) , 'II' h fly a pnon way, ' , , 
law determlOes the WI m ~ w, 0 h h I world feelings (includmg tile feeling of 
because of their members~lp 10 t e J e~:o~~na t motivation for right conduct, This 
respect) can never ~rovl?<: mo:~ k.;~~~~ ;:;1 WolfP, fails primarily for philosophi-
rcading, which Cox Ident~fles w~ the em tiness of tbe will; its lack of freedom; the 
cal, not textual. reasons: It entail te subJ'ect to imperatives; and the moml 
, . bT of an agent, as noumenon, to 
lOa I Ity f r f ' ect 
irrelevance of even the ~e tOg 0 lesp I' , t one or more core claims of C/N, none 
Although different roam tream sch~lars relec ther so tbat rejection or acceptance of 
realizes that each claim mutually ental severy 0 'of the rest Several pas age ' lend 
, -'- ' 'on (or acceptance) , 
one logically reqUlrcs me reJectl d b of C/N • Once commentators 
" ld " brace y proponents, b 
support to tbe twO wor s 7~ 'h t the non-phenomenal must c 
wallow the (specious) dualistic assumption t a 
L . Wh" te Beck 
, he Meta h sics of Morais, tntnslate? by eWIS 1 
lmmanue\ Kant, Foundatlolls of t " P r 400 (Akademie pagmatJOn), , 
(lodianapoli : Bobbs-Merrill Co" Inc,. 1959 • K t's Critique of Practical Reason (CllICa);o: 
1 Cf, LewiWhite Beck. A Commentary 0/1 an 
Universirv of Chicago Press. 1966). 2{6, (N York' Harper &. Row, 1973).3'1. M ' II " Th A Reason ew, r B blls- ern 
l Robcrt Paul Wolf~, Wh/!' ,~on:"(:~)o Critiql,e of Practical RelfSon (Indiannpo IS : r; of rnlioJlll 
• for instance. LeWIS He ec ',' K a S' "The sensuous nnru "from 
Co 1956), 43 (Akademie paginat\O~). whc~~ l~;~~n~icioned laws.llnd therefor~ II ,s~l1lh\: 
bci~gs in general is their exis~encc un er c~~~r~~~er ensUOllS naturc of the samcfbC;;l&:I1IPiri :II 
the point of view oE, reas~n. lCtCron°'dr' to laws which arc independenl dO ,a c Ihe la\~ • 
other hand. is th~'rh ~Iste;ce ~C~O~gl~~ the autonomy of pure rcaSOn, ~n I s':;crseMIlOlli 
conditions and whlc e~e ore co, d ds on cognition, are practlCa '> 1I0 110nl 0 
according to which the eXistence of thtnr~ e::thing else than nature und~r tl~" ~~forc, i Iltr 
n:\ture so far as we can form a concept 0, It, I 's Ihe moral law, and It, t ,e d' ng \\,hOS cl~e pu'rc practical reason, The law of thIS autdn~~1 ;ure world of lhe undcrst3f' [;'0 inucr: 
fundamental law of supersensuousdua;ure an 'ho t interfering with the lawS 0 
counterpart must exist in the worl 0 sense WIt u 
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noumenal. the (plausible) assumption that acts of will are negatively and/or positively 
free, and the (sound) a sumption that the will i some kind of practical reason the core 
claim of C/N follow srraighraway, If we assume that moral agent, becau e not 
phenomenal, must reside solely in a noumenal world and take the Second Analogy a 
proving that the phenomenal will cannOt be negatively free, then it follows that the will. 
as practically free, must be plere practical reason, Or if we as ume the autonomy of will. 
it would seem that "we can suppose a person' will to be free only if we suppose that the 
a, priori moral law is ~ c~nstitutive principle, for it, being applied ,and determining the 
will in a wholly a 'priOri way" (12), Agam, It follows that the WIll must be pure, not 
empirical, 
Despite ample textual support, Cox argues, this cannot be tile be t interpretation of 
Kant: it is philosophically bankrupt, First, pure practical reason. outside oJ time and 
divorced from sensibitity. must be vacuous, Second. raking the moral law a a 
constitutive principle of will means that an agent. though self-Iegi lacing, must lack 
negative fre~d,om: he cannot do o~herwise, Third, "If the agent is, ~ noul11enon in the 
pmely imeltglble realm, then as divorced from all sensuous condttJons he cannOt be 
subject to any temptation, (l':Iow] A p~rso~ i subj,ect to i~peratives onll ins~far as 
reason is not the sole determmant of lus WI ll. that I • only IOsofar as he I subject to 
temptation by empi.r.ical ,object of desire and aversion, [S,o] On t~e con titutiv~/ 
noumenal view an agcnt IS held to be free and thus responSIble only Lasofar as hc IS 
noumenal and tbus untempted and not obliged" (17), And finally. isolated from 
sen ibility. noumenal moral agents can have no feelings. not even respect for the moral 
law. so C/N drains Achtung of its moral significance. consigning it to the dustbin of 
empirical psychology, 
Any convincing reading must avoid these unwelcome implications, In place of CIN, 
Cox offers "The Regulative/Subject View" [RlS), so called because the moral law 
provides a regula.tive, not a constinttive, principle for determining the will and because 
an agent is neither Iloulllenal nor phenomenal but a "subject": "He .is a self or subject 
who occur in a temporal order in which be synthesize objects of experience but is not 
himself an object of experience" (20); in short, subjects are persons, Cox thus defends 
rOllr Iheses: (i) will is empirical practical rcason ; (i i) moral agents are neither noumenal 
nOl' phenomenal but belong to a third ontological order; (iii) moral law, though a 
priori. must be applied a posteriori to practical feelings; and (iv) the feeling of respect 
(nil be gcnerated through a peculiar kind of formal causality, 
Despitc his opposition to Wolff's interpretation, Cox embraces his method of 
~rccOllstructing " Kant's moral philosophy, and for the same reason: though often 
Ontp~lIil1g. inconsistencies allegedly abound in Kant's cthical writings, Cox's assertion 
Ihlll hiS reconstruction is both phi losophically sound and true to Kant' text. however 
annOt b? taken at face value, as he candidly declares that he wi ll "simply set aside" kOlSS ~cs '~~mpati~le with his reading (21), Of course, Cox cites passages throughout 
nt d\7It~,~g . ~vh,ch uPPOrt his interpretation, but given his belief that Kant admits 
r rn~ C IOtuve, Interpretation and a choice between two discordant readings, he optS 
not t 3l po~s<:slng "marked philosophical mcrit" (xi), Readers may find a Kant who is 
Th. much ,l'CCOnstnlctcd" as radically "reconstituted," 
C I View rest at I' , ' f ' h 
fl',J, 1\ can • , " east I~ part. on an Illterpretauon 0 Kant's twlll t eses that 
he , ~nd C PrlnCtlcal and the Identity of human will and practical reason, Taken as 
• lin Ortlln:\te! I I ' , . y, t 1cse t leses generate a contradiction, For Kant generally 
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puts the first by saying that practical rea on det~rmines .the ~ill! but th~t ne~essitat:s 
the separation of practical reason from human wtll. -:- an ImphcatJo~ the IdcmJty cllesls 
explicitly denies. Beck, whom Cox takes as ~ s~nsltlvc and pe:suaslye defend~r ?f the 
CfN view extricates Kant from the contradiCtiOn by constnllng will as con Istmg of 
twO di tin~t demems: animal impulse (a dynamic and conative clement of feeling) and 
human reason (cognitive yet in need of impulse to cause it .to be pl:acrical). Beck's 
reformulation of clle identity thesis however, cannot explam how Impulse can be 
moved by reason, or even acknowledge its vO.ice. . . . . 
Cox tOO reformulates Kant's idemity theSIS, tbough IJ1 a radically different direc-
tion. c'om~on to botb reason and sensuous desire, Cox argues, arc rhe ways in which 
repre entatlolls of inner ense are associated. " .. . the judgment it [reason] makes alter 
the patterns of representations first given in subjective association. The con~rive ~d 
cognitive elements of will are thus related as, on the one hand, a et of patterns III which 
representation first occur a non-rational impulses and, on t!le o:her hand, a set of 
representations in which the patterns are reproduced and revlSed III a new order. , . 
Impulse is not to be construed a a radically distinct element apart from rea on, Rather, 
it is something that reason appropriate and n~akes .its own " (75). John D~wey often 
argued for a similar understanding of the relatlonshlJ? between .reason and Impul COr 
de ire, most notably in his Human Nature and Condllct;S; but did Kant? Cox offers no 
real textual evidence that he did so, which only reinforces one's general suspicion that 
his interpretation, whil kantian" in spirit, does not square with Kant words or 
intention, 
However, Cox does offer a convincing defense of his interpretation of will a 
empirical practical reason, showing how the conative e1e~ent i initially given to 
consciousness as a mere subjective conjunction of representations and then transformed 
into elements of rational judgments. One merit of his interpretation should not be 
slighted; namely, his insistence that when Kant sa>:s ~at "will is nothing else .than 
practical reason"', he mean , that the power of will. IS ~he power of ~ynthcsI~ .or 
judgment. He arg~l.Ies, compellmgly r believe that .practlcal Ju~gments arc Itke. cognmvc 
judgments in that both refer represensations to objects; they differ ~lowever" In that the 
object of cognitive judgments are giv.e~l to us throug? .rep:esentatlons, ~htlc the task 
of practical judgments is to make object real. Cognmve Judgments fall because our 
representations do not correspond, to judged obj~cts ~ practical )udgements, on th~ , tim 
hand, fail for precisely the opposne reason, ThiS difference 10 status .of the obJc .1 of 
judgment mu t be traced to ~ difference i~ the nature of the represe~tatlo~s syntbcslz:t~ 
which, in the case of practical reason, Involves what Cox calls practical fe III1g5 . 
". " they express no charcteristic of any actual object but only the prefer.enc~ of, the 
subject for the occurrence of that object. Through practical feelings, no obJ ct, IS gilt 
for experience" (103). Crucially these feelings, unlike (say) the represent~tlo~rf n 
falling stone, are thorou.ghly revisable, according to rules, moral and othcrwl. c. It:. 
one' inclination for unhealthy foods may be revised in line with a comtnll1l1ellf 
guard against disease such that one actually loses one's desire for them. 
om any, 1922). Sec 
5 John Dewey, Hmn~" NatItYf tmd Conduct (New York: Henry Holt and C. dPS' c" VoL I\. 
. . L L d' f U ifte (len, also John Dewey, Theory of Valuatwn. Internatwna Encyc ope La 0 nJ' 
No.4 (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1939). 
, Kant, Foundations, 412. 
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Here w~ fin? the heart of Cox's distinctive defense of the will as empirical reason' 
:'The ~ractlcal J~dgments of empirical reason take the form of teleological or purposiv~ mte~tl~ns to bnng about the oc~urrence o~ some means, in some circumstances, for the reahz~tlon of some ~n.d. These Judg~ents mcorporate dynamic and sensuous impulses 
of deSire by sYnthesl~ng them, The Judgments further serve to cause the occurrence of 
the means and end I~ten~ed by a mode of efficient causality which is selectively 
employed. T.hus p:,actlcal Judgments or "maxims" , .. are the efficient causes of tbe 
actions they IIltell? (70). Unless sensuOlls implJ!ses were thoroughly revi able, reason ~ou~d n~)t synth~slze them; because reasOn can do so and because impulse, desire, and IOcll~~t1on prOVide at least part of rhe matter of judgments, practical reason mu t be 
empmcal. 
This leads Cox 0 the mora.llaw and its proper interpretation. Here he finds himself 
on fumer .. ground, and proVides rhe reader with (i) an aCCount of the meaning of 
"ought" (II) an a~~wer ~s to why ~he moral law is categorically regulative and ought to 
be obe~ed, and (IU) an I,nterpretatlon of rhe categorical imperative. 
Relymg on a passage In the econd Cririque7, Cox argue that to say that I ought to 
do X means.that r can, need not, but would do X were I fu lly rational. It follows, of 
cour e, that If Kant can show that a fully rational being would ",dopt the mOI'aJ I . It I ' h ~ ,aw as 
categonca y regu. ~tJve, t en anyone and eve.rrone. ought to do so. But why i the 
moral law categOrically reg~latl~e? In cognitive Judgments, the object supplies a 
standard of c~rrectness, IncllOatlo~~ and the practical feelings 011 which they rest, 
however, arc Inherently non-cogllltlve, non-represent.nional. Consequently, objects 
supply no standard of correctness, To avoid subJ'ectivism or even modified relac' . 
K 'd' h d ' . IVlsm, , nnt must provi e u Wit astan ar~ of corr~ctness. This he does by requiring that Our 
Judgments be related to one another In a certall1 way, As Cox puts it, "Thus the Id 
( I " . f 'ea or 'ystem , t 1~ a pnort conceptJo~ 0 a u~ifie.d, coherent, consistent totality) supplies the 
only crJter~on of co:rectness III ~ractJcal Judgments. And this imply means that the 
tnorallaw IS categOrically re.gulatlve of practical judgments" (109). 
. The moral law, then.' reqUJre~ that one's intentions (or "maxims") be made systemat-
Ic.ally coherent. But ~Ill ~ot thIS lead to separate sets of such maxims for each person, 
sets whlc~ may confltct I?ter-personally? Cox's interpretation of the moral law leads h~m .to thlll~ not .. Acc~r~I~,g to Cox, Kant's notion of contradiction has two parts, one ~~I~t;llg to .unthlllk~bIltty and another relating to "unwillability." Maxims violating th~ list stnctu:e ~all because, though thinkable as subjective maxims, they are not 
d'flnf kable as obJect~ve laws that everyone would follow. To PUt his point in a slightly I crent way maxim h' h . h b h' k bl ' . 
Ihinkablc i' s. W IC mig t e t In a . e In a m.echanlstic order might not be 
I'd K ~ a teleoJ~glcal order of nature when willed universally. Rather than push c ant telcolog cal' h 
Ihem cc . I t· , I com~ltl1lents, as Ot er commentators often do, Cox makes U .1111 it to 11S II1terpretanon.' 
nwlll, ble maxims alw . . f d' 
nnict \Vir! I : ays concern lDlper ect utles and they fail because they 
lOt leI' m3XJms In tJ' l b d·f.I· ' . . 
llIu l choo I ~ ,par .cu ar, ecause Uti lu actiOn IS an end m Itself one 
I e mora m x' f th ak f ' awrul l1c~ f . a. IIns or e s e 0 the Idea of moral system itself: "Since the 
h . actions must be d d bl' 
l co 1;1Iitivation of m a opte as an 0 Igatory end, the means to that end i. e., 
y pOwers of thought, will, elf-knowledge, and worldly wisdom _ is 
( . ~ 
. 1"JU'llll' ofp. . 
, cr I/.I p > "CtLcal Reason, tr. L. W Beck 20 
.' "t()n, The Cate orit:; I . .' . . . . 
g a ImperatIVe, Tlurd EdltlOn (London: Hutchinson, 1958), 44. 

